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Abstract: In this paper, we take the perspective of app developers. 
Specifically, based on a sample of top paid apps from three major app stores, 
i.e., App Store, Google Play, and Blackberry World, we construct a hedonic 
price model to examine the role of relevant factors in price formation in the app 
market. Our results suggest a strong evidence of two-sided market effects. In 
fact, the lower price charged for apps operating as two-sided markets reflect the 
strategy of subsidising users, due to the positive cross-side externalities they 
exert on valuable third parties. Surprisingly, the effects of trialability, in-app 
purchase and mechanisms to build reputation are not significant in the context 
of successful apps. Finally, we find weak evidence that developers of top paid 
apps prefer price skimming to penetration price strategies. 
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1 Introduction 
Receiving breaking news, instant messaging with friends at every moment of the day, 
categorising portable songs, killing waiting time with tricky games are only some of the 
numerous routine activities many people perform using apps. Essentially, people 
download apps to increase the number of functionalities of their mobile device and, thus, 
carry a set of easy tools useful for the most disparate purposes, just like a sort of Swiss 
army knife available in their pockets. Indeed mobile apps have the potential to 
personalise the users’ experience at any time and everywhere they like (Palumbo et al., 
2014). The impressive impact of apps on people’s everyday life can be quantified by 
exemplificative numbers. Recent industry statistics suggest, in fact, that the time per day 
spent by US consumers using apps increased by 35% in 2012, and was higher than the 
time spent on the web and quite close to that spent watching TV (Keynote Competitive 
Research, 2012; Khalaf, 2012; Nielsen, 2012). Also, numerous relevant industry studies 
report that the market is literally booming. Recent estimates provided by Gartner Inc. 
suggest that the revenue generated from customers buying and downloading apps for 
smartphones and tablets will step from $26 billion in 2013 up to $77 billion in 2017, 
whereas the number of downloads will increase from 102 billion to 268 billion (Gartner, 
2013; Lunden, 2013). 
However, apps for mobile devices have been around approximately since the late 
1990s. Initially the market was dominated by mobile network operators (MNO), that 
constructed a highly centralised model with substantial, but yet not fully exploited, 
market potential (Kuo and Yu, 2006; Ghezzi et al., 2010). This context was 
revolutionised in 2008 by Apple that, launching the App Store, introduced the application 
store distribution paradigm in Mobile Commerce. The strategies of leveraging on strong 
assets such as brand reputation and the iPhone innovation, of linking the App Store to 
other businesses, i.e., iTunes, and of incentivising third party independence and revenue 
sharing allowed Apple to change the rules of the game, relegating MNOs to a marginal 
role and opening the gates to new players (Ghezzi et al., 2010). In fact, in response to the 
great success obtained by Apple, since 2008, several big mobile device manufacturers, 
such as RIM Blackberry, Samsung and Nokia, have launched their own app stores. This 
rapid proliferation of app stores has also involved Google, that launched the Android 
mobile operating systems (OS) and made the Google Play (initially Android Market) 
available to users in 2008, Microsoft, that launched Windows Marketplace for Mobile 
(later, Windows Phone Store) and, more recently, Amazon, that introduced the Amazon 
Appstore. Currently, App Store and Google Play are by far the most popular stores1. 
Microsoft and RIM Blackberry platforms precede other players. However, while App 
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Store generates the highest total revenue, numerous sources indicate Blackberry World as 
the most profitable store to developers (Rocha, 2012; VisionMobile, 2012). 
An application store is an online distribution platform from which a user can 
download apps developed by third parties for mobile devices supported by the platform. 
However, it does not resemble a traditional online retail model (e.g., Chen et al., 2014), 
where the reseller charge a price based on wholesale price set by product providers. 
Rather, the price is set by developers who, according to a pre-determined sharing rule set 
by the app store owner, appropriate most of the revenue for each transaction (70%, in all 
the major stores), whereas the store owners retain the remaining. In fact, an app store can 
be categorised as a two-sided market, i.e., an economic platform attracting two distinct 
groups of users, developers and consumers in this case, who provide each other with 
intra- and/or inter-network benefits (Rochet and Tirole, 2003). By means of an app store, 
a multitude of developers can reach a vast scale of consumers worldwide, that they might 
not be able to reach on their own. On the other hand, consumers download apps to satisfy 
a number of needs and, thus, increase the utility associated with the usage of their mobile 
device. Finally, the distribution platform can derive a direct benefit appropriating a 
portion of revenue for each transaction in the store, and a much higher indirect benefit 
from the increased value of their correlated businesses, e.g., mobile devices. The 
presence of these interactions among all the involved actors is a unique feature, which 
distinguishes the mobile app market from traditional two-sided markets. 
The rapid growth of the app market offers numerous business opportunities to a 
multitude of developers, which, however, imply facing several important decisions 
(Palumbo and Dominici, 2015). To cite a few of them, developers have to choose what 
and how many apps to market, which app store to target, which business model to adopt 
for their apps, and how to price them. However, while tons of articles have been available 
online from numerous media since its birth, the mobile app market has started attracting 
researchers only very recently. The delay may be explained by the fact that, due to its 
recent constitution, no databases organising relevant information have been available in 
the market, which poses a serious obstacle to the above scientific purposes. The main 
sources of data remain app stores themselves, with the exception of a few research firms 
specialised on the market. This causes non-trivial problems of data collection as well as 
lack of some important data. The consequence is that there are only few relevant works 
focusing on this intriguing market to investigate issues related to demand estimation 
(Carare, 2012; Garg and Telang, 2013; Ghose and Han, 2014). 
In this paper, we also take the perspective of developers. However, we construct a 
hedonic price model and test a number of hypotheses to examine the role of relevant 
factors in price formation in the app market. Specifically, with the support of a rich 
dataset built ad hoc, we investigate price formation for top paid apps, i.e., the most 
popular paid apps. As our focus is on price rather than sales estimation, our work 
complements the above studies shedding light on this important, yet understudied, market 
with regard to price decisions of successful apps. We also significantly contribute to the 
relevant literature on hedonic price of software products (Gandal, 1994; Brynjolfsson and 
Kemerer, 1996; Gallaugher and Wang, 2002) providing novel evidence from a new 
market having some distinctive features. In fact, differently from most of software 
markets studied in this literature, the app market is characterised by a unique distribution 
model, which, with negligible entry barriers and the implementation of various 
mechanisms [software developer kit (SDK), feedback systems, etc…], facilitates access 
to a multitude of developers and consumers. As a result, a multitude of products 
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satisfying the most disparate needs are offered in the same competitive arena. Also, a 
further peculiar feature of this market is that the type of consumers having access to a 
given store strictly depends on the characteristics of consumers purchasing the mobile 
devices supported by that store. Finally, apps are, in general, characterised by frequent 
usage, marked easiness to use, limited prices, and might operate themselves as two-sided 
markets. By performing a cross-store analysis using data from the most relevant app 
stores, namely App Store, Google Play and Blackberry World, our paper advances 
understanding of some existing theories by testing the role of known price determinants 
in a new market. Specifically, we study whether software developer practices, such as the 
adoption of a two-sided market business model, the introduction of free trial versions, the 
adoption of a version-to-upgrade model (commonly referred to as in-app purchase in the 
app market), are relevant to price decisions in the context of successful apps. Also, we 
investigate the role of the introductory pricing policy chosen by developers. Unravelling 
the effect of these factors may support developers’ future price decisions. Finally, we also 
examine the role of online mechanisms to build reputation (e.g., ratings), which, although 
extensively studied in the literature on online commerce, are absent in previous studies of 
hedonic price of software products. In this case, we explore whether there exists a strong 
rationale behind the use of such mechanisms. 
By way of anticipation, our results demonstrate a strong impact a strong two-sided 
market effect. Specifically, in accordance with economic theory, the lower price charged 
for apps operating as two-sided markets reflect the strategy of subsidising the mass of end 
users, due to the positive cross-side externalities they exert on valuable third parties, e.g., 
advertisers. Surprisingly, the effects of free trialability, upgrading via in-app purchase, 
and mechanisms to build reputation are not significant. For these results we provide 
tentative explanations, which relate to the characteristics of successful paid apps. Finally, 
we find weak evidence that developers of top paid apps utilise a price skimming strategy, 
as apps first released are associated with higher prices. This result suggests that the 
benefits derived taking advantage from customer heterogeneity might prevail over those 
obtainable setting low introductory prices and exploiting network externalities among 
users. Overall, we believe that our results serve to compose a first useful picture of price 
drivers in the app market, showing how different from other software markets the app 
market could be with regard to the effect of certain factors on price. 
The paper is organised as follows. We first discuss the theoretical background and 
introduce the hypotheses. Then, the econometric analysis is presented. In turn, we 
describe the dataset, the explanatory variables and the regression model, discuss 
empirical findings and relative implications, and provide several extensions of our model. 
Finally, we conclude. 
2 Theory and hypotheses 
2.1 The hedonic price model 
Our paper builds upon the well-known theoretical model of hedonic price (Rosen, 1974). 
Hedonic price models are utilised to estimate how different features of a differentiated 
product contribute to the utility customers derive from the product, and, thus, their 
willingness to pay. Under this model, the price is the resulting function of product 
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attributes’ implicit prices. The implicit price of a given product attribute corresponds to 
the consumers’ willingness-to-pay for a unit increment of the level of that attribute. 
The hedonic regression model is fully consolidated in empirical literature and has 
been used for price estimation of a wide variety of products and services. A historical 
summary of this literature can be found in Berndt (1991). There have been a considerable 
number of applications to information technology products. Hardware products have 
been considered first (Chow, 1967; Berndt, 1991). More recently, attention has been 
shifted to include also software products in hedonic analyses (Gandal, 1994, 1995; 
Brynjolfsson and Kemerer, 1996; Gallaugher and Wang, 2002). These studies mainly 
demonstrate the existence of network externalities in software markets and the relative 
beneficial impact on price formation. Our paper share similarities with these studies as 
we construct a hedonic model to investigate the effect of relevant price determinants in 
the software market. However, we are interested in exploring price formation of a 
particular software product category, i.e., mobile apps, due to the specificities of this 
market as well as the popularity gained in the very last few years. We study of the role of 
factors, such as trialability, to point out notable differences from former works on 
hedonic price of software products. In addition, some determinants, such as the online 
mechanisms to build reputation or the opportunity to upgrade to more complete versions, 
while common in other streams of literature, have not been incorporated in the above 
studies on hedonic price estimation of software products. Finally, compared to 
Gallaugher and Wang (2002) who also analyse the effect of two-sided market 
externalities, we take a different perspective. In fact, they explore whether firms with a 
greater installed market base on one side of the network (web browser market) will enjoy 
a higher price on other side (web server market) than rivals with smaller market-base. We 
study how the price charged to end users will be modified as a consequence of the 
existence of cross-side externalities when apps operate as a two-sided market. Our model 
is enriched including several control variables, which help provide more accurate 
estimates. Next, we present and discuss hypotheses in detail. 
2.2 Two-sided market effect 
Many real markets with network externalities exhibit the characteristics of a two-sided 
market. Some examples of two-sided platforms include e-marketplaces (where suppliers 
and buyers are the two sides of the market), social networks (users and advertisers), game 
consoles (gamers and game developers), TV and other media (viewers/readers and 
advertisers) (Rochet and Tirole, 2003; Parker and van Alstyne, 2005). For surveys of the 
theoretical literature on two-sided markets readers can refer to Rochet and Tirole (2006). 
A two-sided market is characterised by the existence of cross-side externalities. That is, 
the demand from one side strongly depends on the demand from the other side, and vice 
versa. Also, in many cases, users on one side will be attracted to the platform only if a 
critical mass of users on the other side is reached. The existence of cross-side 
externalities and the relative magnitude drastically impact on pricing strategy. As a 
matter of fact, when setting a price for each side, platform owners should factor in the 
impact of each side on the other side’s growth and willingness to pay. Otherwise they 
might end up suffering substantial revenue losses. Broadly speaking, in a two-sided 
network we can identify a ‘subsidy side’ and a ‘money side’ (Eisenmann et al., 2006). 
The first group, when consisting of a high number of users, is highly valuable to the 
second group. A profitable pricing structure would therefore imply to target aggressively, 
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i.e., subsidise, the side of users who are able exert a larger positive externality on the 
other side, and monetise from the latter abundantly (Rochet and Tirole, 2003; Parker and 
van Alstyne, 2005; Armstrong, 2006; Rysman, 2009)2. Very few studies provide 
empirical evidence of how the presence of two-sided network externalities influences the 
pricing structure (Evans, 2003; Kaiser and Wright, 2006). For instance, in full accordance 
to the theoretical predictions, German magazines seem to subsidise readers and make 
profit from advertisers as the latter group, instead of the former, value the opposite side 
more (Kaiser and Wright, 2006). Evidence of cross-side externalities can be found also in 
Gallaugher and Wang (2002), although they focus on whether firms with a greater 
installed market base on one side (web browser market) will enjoy higher price on the 
other side (web server market) than rivals with smaller market-base. 
Depending on the specific business model adopted by the developer, apps might 
operate as a two-sided market attracting app users on one side and interested third parties 
on the other side. Interested third parties could be advertisers or info seekers, i.e., firms 
seeking information about consumers for specific business purposes. In fact, a 
considerable number of paid apps, such as games among the others, contain third parties’ 
advertisements. Furthermore, developers of certain apps, such as social networking 
applications, centre their revenue model on building a large user-base to attract info 
seekers and, thus, earning from non-personally identifiable information selling (Williams, 
2009). Therefore, according to the theory, if there exist strong cross-side network 
externalities between app users and potentially interested third parties, and specifically 
app users exert an irresistible appeal to such actors, we should observe that apps 
operating as a two-sided market, e.g., ad-supported apps or apps collecting and selling 
data, have lower prices than those that do not exhibit such characteristics. As a result, we 
can formulate the following hypothesis: 
• Hypothesis 1 (H1): prices of apps operating as two-sided markets are lower than 
those of apps that are not two-sided platforms. 
2.3 Trialability effect 
Many information goods, such as software, fall into the category of experience goods. 
That is, consumers can evaluate some of their features accurately only upon consumption. 
Exacerbated consumers’ uncertainty about product value might be quite detrimental to 
sellers with a negative impact on price premiums (Dimoka et al., 2012). To cope with 
such an uncertainty, software developers often provide free trial versions of their 
products so that users can download to test them before purchasing. This is facilitated by 
the fact that, unlike physical goods, information goods entail negligible marginal costs for 
both production and online distribution. Free trial products are largely observable in the 
software market in two general forms: free fully functional versions with limited trial 
time, i.e., time-locked versions, and free ‘demo’ versions with notably limited 
functionalities, i.e., limited versions (Cheng and Liu, 2012). In general, trialability 
measures the extent to which potential adopters perceive that they have an opportunity to 
experiment with an innovation prior to committing to its usage (Rogers, 1983; Moore and 
Benbasat, 1991; Agarwal and Prasad, 1997). For instance, trialability has been shown to 
be crucial in the adoption of information technologies (Agarwal and Prasad, 1997). Both  
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theoretical and empirical studies have examined the effects of using free trials or samples 
on variables, such as probability of purchase, price and profit, in case of physical goods 
(Scott and Yalch, 1980; Goering, 1985; Bawa and Shoemaker, 2004). More recently, 
some authors have investigated the effects of trialability in case of information goods 
(Gallaugher and Wang, 2002; Cheng and Tang, 2010; Cheng and Liu, 2012). Through a 
trial version users can test the product and resolve the uncertainty about its real value to 
them. Also, trialability can serve to signal product quality as the knowledge that a product 
is available in a free trial version is some sort of guarantee to customers (Gallaugher and 
Wang, 2002). For these reasons, it is expected that consumers will pay a higher price 
given the opportunity to test a product before buying. As a matter of fact, in the web 
server market, Gallaugher and Wang (2002) empirically find that products for which free 
trial versions are available are associated with price premiums. In fact, ceteris paribus, 
they show that firms offering a trial version enjoyed a price premium of roughly 110 to 
120 percent. In addition to resolving consumers’ uncertainty, the introduction of a free 
trial version helps exploit the network effects, which often characterise information 
goods. In presence of network externalities among users, releasing a free trial version 
supports a more effective diffusion of firms’ new products (Cheng and Liu, 2012). In this 
case, consumers assign a higher value to the product due to the higher installed base. As a 
result, a positive effect of free trialability on price of the commercial product is expected. 
Results in Cheng and Liu (2012) are, in fact, consistent with this assertion.  
Developers often release a free version associated with the paid version of their apps. 
Therefore, the app market is suitable to test for the existence of a positive effect of 
trialability. However, not all free app versions associated with paid app versions can be 
considered as proper free trial app versions. Based on our earlier discussion, only free 
versions offering very limited features or being time-locked are proper free trial versions. 
However, often a free app version differs from the corresponding paid version essentially 
because of (more intense) presence of ads. In these cases, the risk of demand 
cannibalisation for their paid products as a consequence of the introduction of a free 
version might be high, resulting in a significant price reduction for the paid product. 
More in general, some recent studies point out possible negative effects of free trial 
versions on the commercial product in presence of low product differentiation between 
them, e.g., when there are a few differences in terms of functionalities or the trial period 
is not sufficiently short (Bawa and Shoemaker, 2004; Smith and Telang, 2009; Cheng 
and Tang, 2010; Cheng and Liu, 2012). Therefore, it is important for developers to 
accurately design their free trial versions, reducing the degree of substitutability to a 
minimum. Otherwise, the free trial version would no longer serve as an opportunity to let 
consumer experiment with the product prior to committing to its usage. Rather, it would 
have the role of a possibly more appealing substitute. Due to our primary interest in the 
effect of trialability, in this paper, we distinguish between free trial version and free 
version, considering as free trial versions only those versions, which present very limited 
functionalities and/or a reasonably short trial period. With this distinction, we can follow 
Gallaugher and Wang (2002) and, thus, support the positive effects of the free trial 
version on app prices in the following hypothesis: 
• Hypothesis 2 (H2): apps offering free trial versions to users have higher prices. 
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2.4 In-app purchase effect 
For numerous information goods consumers are often allowed to purchase additional 
features to the product version they have previously bought. This practice is commonly 
utilised also in case of apps, referred to as in-app purchase. Specifically, a user who has 
downloaded an app, e.g., a game, at a given price (or free) is given the opportunity to 
purchase additional features, e.g., additional game levels or credits, or upgrade to more 
complete product versions directly inside the app. In this way, in-app purchase allows 
developers to price discriminate highly valuable consumers who will upgrade to more 
complete product versions from less valuable consumers who will be content with the 
base version. In its essence, in-app purchase combines versioning and upgrading 
practices. There is a considerable amount of theoretical studies on versioning of 
information goods (Bhargava and Choudary, 2001, 2008; Wei and Nault, 2013). These 
works suggest that versioning is optimal only under certain conditions. For instance, 
nonlinear consumer utility function is necessary for versioning to be optimal (Bhargava 
and Choudary, 2008). Recently, Wei and Nault (2013) introduce, in a two-version setting, 
the possibility that consumers who bought the low quality version upgrade to the high 
quality version at a certain price. They show that, under the version-to-upgrade setting, 
versioning is optimal and there might be consumers who will upgrade to the high quality 
version after purchasing the low quality version. It is quite straightforward that the 
presence of two versions and the opportunity to upgrade help segment the market 
profitably so that the price of the version with basic functionalities is lower than the price 
the provider would charge if only one version was released. In line with this argument, 
we expect that developers giving the opportunity to in-app purchase will naturally sell the 
base version at a lower price, as opposed to developers who do not utilise such practice.  
• Hypothesis 3 (H3): apps allowing in-app purchase of additional features have lower 
prices. 
2.5 Introductory pricing policy effect 
How firms should vary price over the product life cycle has been extensively studied in 
marketing literature. For surveys of this literature, readers can refer to Tellis (1986), 
Mahajan et al. (1990), Noble and Gruca (1999), and more recently Chatterjee (2009). 
Specifically, when introducing a new product, firms can balance between two extreme 
pricing strategies, namely market skimming or market penetration (Dean, 1950; Mahajan 
et al., 1990). Under a skimming strategy, firms initially set a high price targeting high 
valuable customers. Then, the price is gradually decreased attracting less valuable 
segments. Essentially, a skimming strategy allows, for new products, the implementation 
of inter-temporal price discrimination in presence of multiple segments that differ in 
value. On the other hand, a penetration strategy implies the use of a low price at first to 
capture a large market-base. Then, once the product is established in the market, the price 
can be raised. Normative results provided by the literature are somehow contrasting. 
Some studies support the former pricing strategy in presence of price impact on market 
potential, learning curve effect or the possibility that the product can be copied (Kalish, 
1983; Nascimento and Vanhonacker, 1988). Furthermore, price skimming is preferable in 
presence of high customer heterogeneity and product differentiation (Dean, 1969; Tellis, 
1986; Noble and Gruca, 1999). The latter pricing policy is predicted in presence of a 
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strong ‘word-of-mouth’ effect of early adopters on late adopters and, more in general, in 
presence of network externalities. In this case firms might find optimal to subsidise early 
adopters with a low introductory price to stimulate their purchases and exploit network 
effects, and then increase the price when a large market-base has been created (Robinson 
and Lakhani, 1975; Dolan and Jeuland, 1981; Thompson and Teng, 1984). Empirical 
analyses of new product pricing practices in the most disparate industries tend to be in 
line with the normative results (Noble and Gruca, 1999). In fact, some empirical studies 
indicate that price skimming has a positive impact for high-tech products having 
innovative features (Yoon and Lilien, 1985; Beard and Easingwood, 1996). Other studies 
highlight that in presence of significant network effects, e.g., in case of information 
goods, firms often use a low introductory price to reach a large market-base quickly 
(Shapiro and Varian, 1999; Lee and Colarelli O’Connor, 2003; Dubé et al., 2010; Liu, 
2010). 
Apps reasonably belong to a product category subject to network externalities. 
Therefore, the existence of considerable word-of-mouth and other network effects among 
users should induce developers to utilise a penetration policy to exploit the advantage of a 
large installed market-base. In this case, ceteris paribus, apps first released should have a 
lower price than apps available in subsequent versions. However, numerous successful 
apps have unique features or might not be easily imitable or substitutable. Furthermore, 
for many apps there might exist users who are highly valuable. For instance, very 
passionate gamers can certainly afford to purchase their preferred app right after the 
release at any price. Developers might find optimal to skim this segment and later 
decrease the price to target less addicted users. In this case, ceteris paribus, apps first 
released should have a higher price than apps available in subsequent versions. Therefore, 
we can formulate two opposite hypotheses, each holding if a price skimming or a 
penetration price strategy is used, respectively: 
• Hypothesis 4a (H4a): apps released in the initial version have a higher price than 
apps available in subsequent versions. 
• Hypothesis 4b (H4b): apps released in the initial version have a lower price than 
apps available in subsequent versions. 
2.6 Reputation mechanism effect 
The effect of seller reputation on pricing decisions has been widely investigated in the 
literature. Economic theory typically suggests the existence of a positive relationship 
between seller reputation and price (Klein and Leffler, 1981; Shapiro, 1983). This is 
mainly because the seller reputation can be viewed in the long run as a proxy for quality 
characteristics that are unobservable to consumers before the transaction takes place. 
Some empirical studies conducted in the software industry have tended to support the 
theoretical results (Banerjee and Duflo, 2000). However, a significant number of 
empirical researches on this issue have flourished only after the introduction and growth 
of e-commerce. Different from offline markets, internet allows an easy implementation of 
mechanisms to build reputation, e.g., ratings, comments and reviews provided by buyers, 
which are commonly referred to as feedback systems (Bolton et al., 2004). Also, in the  
e-commerce environment, the importance of reputation increases as payment and 
delivery rarely occur simultaneously (Standifird, 2001). In fact, several recent studies 
empirically demonstrate that mechanisms to build reputation have positive effects on 
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price as they are a vehicle to signal quality and increase customer trust in presence of 
uncertainty about product quality and/or seller reliability (Standifird, 2001; Ba and 
Pavlou, 2002; Bajari and Hortacsu, 2003; Livingston, 2005; Houser and Wooders, 2006; 
Pavlou and Dimoka, 2006; Resnick et al., 2006; Lucking-Reiley et al., 2007). However, it 
is noteworthy that there are a few studies in this strand of literature that point out that no 
reputational benefits, at least in terms of price premiums, are observed (Resnick and 
Zeckhauser, 2002; Kauffman and Woods, 2006). Also, whether reputation mechanisms 
allow firms to enjoy price premiums might depend on the type of metric used to measure 
such effect. For instance, in their study on price determinants in eBay, Lucking-Reiley et 
al. (2007) find that the summary measure (which takes into account both positive and 
negative feedbacks) has no influence on price, whereas negative feedbacks significantly 
impact on price. In a similar vein, negative feedbacks might be influential, whereas 
positive feedbacks might not (Lucking-Reiley et al., 2007), or vice versa (Ba and Pavlou, 
2002; Bajari and Hortacsu, 2003). Also, in case of positive and statistically significant 
effect, the economic impact of reputation might not be relevant (Melnik and Alm, 2002). 
Dellarocas (2003) provides a comprehensive review of the whole stream of literature. 
In spite of the reputation of app store owners such as Apple, Google and Blackberry 
and the adoption of more or less strict criteria through the release of SDKs that 
developers have to meet in order to market their apps on such platforms, users might still 
be uncertain about the real value an app can generate to them before they use it. For this 
reason, most of the app store owners offer to users the opportunity to rate the apps they 
download, and, as a result, provide a feedback about the quality level delivered by 
developers. In line with most of previous works, we hypothesise a positive influence of 
such reputation mechanisms on price. In addition to the effect of online rating 
mechanisms, there might be additional price premiums that are exclusive to those giant 
developers who have a fully established reputation worldwide. For instance, some app 
developers are giant companies or represent famous brands in the entertainment industry 
such as Electronic Arts, Activision Blizzard and Disney interactive3. According to the 
economic theory of reputation, the worldwide recognition reserved to such companies or 
brands should guarantee higher price premium returns, ceteris paribus. Combining the 
effects of the feedback systems and established worldwide reputation, we formulate: 
• Hypothesis 5 (H5): developers of apps with higher ratings on average enjoy higher 
prices for their apps. In addition, apps of developers with fully established reputation 
worldwide have a higher price. 
3 The econometric model 
To test the formulated hypotheses, the following general hedonic price model is 
introduced: 
( ), , , , , ,itit it it it it itP f TS TS IA IP R C=  (1) 
where, for every observation unit i and period t, Pit is the price, TSit is the two-sided 
market attribute, Tit is the trialability attribute, IAit is the in-app purchase attribute, IPit is 
the introductory pricing policy attribute, Rit is the set of reputation attributes, and Cit is a 
set of control attributes. 
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3.1 Data 
To obtain all the relevant information required in (1), we built a dataset ad hoc collecting 
data of top (i.e., most downloaded) paid apps for smartphones by weekly exploring the 
Italian version of the major app stores, namely App Store, Google Play and Blackberry 
World. Specifically, we recorded data from the top paid app ranking publicly available in 
each of these platforms every Friday in the period going from 6 May to 23 December 
2011 (34 observation periods in total). Data collection from top paid app rankings is in 
line with our objective of estimating the hedonic price function for successful apps. In 
addition, top paid app rankings are also utilised by Carare (2012) and Garg and Telang 
(2013) for their studies on the relationship between ranks and sales. It is noteworthy that 
app stores do not release detailed information about the criteria to compute top app 
rankings. However, several sources agree that app stores usually compile top app 
rankings based on sales within a 24 hours window (Carare, 2012). After a preliminary 
analysis with a larger rank range, we restricted to the top ten paid apps. In this aspect we 
differ from Carare (2012) and Garg and Telang (2013), who, instead, collect data mostly 
from top 100 and top 200 paid app rankings of the App Store, respectively. Our choice is 
due to the less automatable data collection effort in our case. In fact, while the data 
utilised by Carare (2012) and Garg and Telang (2013) are retrievable upfront from the 
app store, numerous data crucial to perform our analysis, such as whether the given app 
has ads in it or not, ratings of all the apps marketed by the given developer, number of 
apps marketed by the given developer, the presence of a free trial or free version, were 
not immediately retrievable and required subsequent accurate app analyses as well as 
extensive checks in the app stores and developers’ websites. Furthermore, restricting to 
top ten rankings is perfectly in line with our objective of exploring price drivers of 
successful apps. It is in fact demonstrated that the relationship between rank and actual 
sales is very steep so the very first ranked apps account for most of the revenues in a store 
(Canalys, 2012; Farago, 2012). We also decided to access the rankings one day a week 
instead of doing it everyday because we noted that the composition of top ten rankings 
did not change significantly within a week, although top ten paid apps switched their 
ranks sometimes. Most importantly, our dependent variable, i.e., the price, (and, also 
time-variant explanatory variables) very rarely changed within a week. Therefore, 
extending our data collection to more than one day a week would have naturally yielded 
more observations, which, however, would have just been duplications of already 
available information in most of the cases. Our data collection frequency differs from that 
of Carare (2012) and Garg and Telang (2013) due to the different purposes. They collect 
daily data from larger rank ranges, but their observation period is shorter compared to our 
time span. The reason is because they study the relationship between ranks and sales. 
Thus, they need to collect samples involving large rank ranges, e.g., 1–200, and higher 
rank variability for each app, which can be obtained even with fairly short observation 
period, e.g., two months. On the other hand, we conduct a hedonic price estimation 
analysis. As a very low number of price variations can be encountered from a day to the 
subsequent, a longer time span and weekly data collection seem to be more appropriate in 
our study to increase the price variability for each app.  
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It is noteworthy that all the distribution platforms also provide the top free app (i.e., 
the most downloaded free apps) ranking in addition to the top paid app ranking. 
However, we do not consider this ranking, as our intent is to provide a hedonic price 
analysis, which usually is conducted with non-zero prices. Also, paid apps still account 
for the highest percentage of the revenues generated in app markets (Serricchio, 2013; 
Lunden, 2013). Interestingly, App Store and Google Play also provide a top grossing app 
ranking (i.e., apps generating the highest revenue combining purchase price, advertising, 
in-app purchase and other revenue streams). Collecting data from such rankings would 
have also been appealing. There are two obstacles that induced us to consider only paid 
apps. First, Blackberry World and other stores do not provide this ranking, which would 
make the comparison impossible. Second, in both App Store and Google Play top ten 
grossing rankings, numerous apps are free. 
After recording the top ten paid apps from the three stores for all the 34 weeks we 
obtained a rich dataset containing 1,020 observations. Due to our data collection 
procedure we did not know a priori how many apps would have been included in our 
sample. However, a significant number of apps were expected to rank in the top ten 
rankings for more than one week, which helps consider the temporal variability of price. 
As a matter of fact, the total number of observations, i.e., 1,020, is related to 299 apps4, 
that have been at least once in at least one of the three rankings during the specified 
period. Thus, our sample is an unbalanced panel dataset where more successful apps 
carry higher weight in the analysis due to the higher number of times they appear in a 
ranking. 
3.2 Variables 
We define a set of variables to test our hypotheses. Table 1 summarises the description 
and the modalities of all the variables, whereas Table 2 shows the relative descriptive 
statistics. 
Table 1 Variables description 
Variables Description 
App category (education; fun and 
entertainment; games; healthcare and 
fitness; money and finance; music; news 
and info; photo and video; social network; 
themes and customisation; transportation; 
utility) 
12 binary variables, each equal to 1 if the app 
belongs to the respective category; 0 otherwise. 
App size Continuous variable measuring the size (in Mbytes) 
of the app in the given week. 
Developer fame Binary variable equal to 1 if the app developer is a 
giant developer with established reputation 
worldwide; 0 otherwise. Based on revenue 
information and worldwide recognition we identify 
ten top developers in our sample, i.e., Activision 
Blizzard, Apple, Capcom, Disney Interactive, 
Electronic Arts, Gameloft, Konami, Namco Bandai, 
Sega Sammy, Take-Two Interactive. We also 
include Marvel Entertainment and DC Comics due 
to their huge popularity. 
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Table 1 Variables description (continued) 
Variables Description 
Developer rating (no developer rating; low 
developer rating; medium developer 
rating; high developer rating) 
Four binary variables, each equal to 1 if, in the given 
week and store, the app developer rating belongs to 
the respective category; 0 otherwise. 
Developer type Binary variable equal to 1 if the app is developed by 
a firm; 0 if developed by individual(s). 
In-app purchase Binary variable equal to 1 if the app allows in-app 
purchase; 0 otherwise. 
Number developer apps Positive integer variable indicating the number of 
apps marketed by the developer of the given app in 
the given week in the specific store. 
Price (dependent variable) Continuous variable measuring the price (in Euros) 
of the app in the given week. 
Store (Google Play; App Store; Blackberry 
World) 
Three binary variables, each equal to 1 if, in the 
given week, the app is available for download in the 
respective store; 0 otherwise.  
Total apps Total number of apps downloadable from the given 
store in the given week.  
Two-sided market effect Binary variable equal to 1 if the developer utilises a 
two-sided market business model for the app (e.g., 
enjoys revenue from advertisers in addition to 
selling to final users) in the given week; 0 otherwise. 
First version Binary variable equal to 1 if, at the given week, the 
app is released in the first version, 0 if it is released 
in subsequent version. 
Free trial version Binary variable equal to 1 if a free trial version for 
the app is available in the given week; 0 otherwise. 
Free version Binary variable equal to 1 if a free version for the 
app is available in the given week; 0 otherwise. 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics 
Variables Descr. stat. Variables Descr. stat. 
Binary variables % 1 Binary variables % 1 
Google play 33.33% (23.17%) Education 0.49% (0.95%) 
App store 33.33% (41.59%) Fun and entertainment 6.08% (6.35%) 
Blackberry world 33.33% (35.24%) Games 35.2% (40%) 
Two-sided market effect 19.51% (11.11%) Healthcare and fitness 0.59% (1.59%) 
Notes: The values outside the parentheses are computed at the observation level, whereas 
the values inside the parentheses are computed at the app level. However, for 
developer fame, developer type, and number developer apps the values inside the 
parentheses are computed at the developer level (the total number of developers is 
227), whereas for app size and first version they are computed at the app version 
level (the total number of different versions is 487). As for the developer rating 
dummies, the statistics are computed considering only the total observations 
because the rating may not only vary within the 34 weeks period but also among 
different apps of the same developer due to the fact that for each app we omit the 
relative rating to avoid a reverse causality problem. 
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics (continued) 
Variables Descr. stat. Variables Descr. stat. 
Free trial version 23.63% (19.37%) Money and finance 0.49% (1.27%) 
Free version 21.76% (11.95%) Music 6.27% (4.13%) 
In-app purchase 17.06% (17.14%) Transportation 0.98% (1.9%) 
First version 12.94% (13.96%) News and info 1.08% (2.86%) 
Developer fame 8.14% (5.29%) Photo and video 4.71% (6.98%) 
No developer rating 11.57% Social network 4.12% (1.27%) 
Low developer rating 0.69% Themes and customisation 12.35% (12.06%) 
Medium developer rating 27.16% Utility 27.65% (20.63%) 
High developer rating 60.59% Developer type 82.45% (66.96%) 
Variables Descriptive statistics 
Continuous/discrete Mean Std.D. Min Max 
App size (Mbyte) 32.876 (39.172) 131.303 (138.666) 0.02 1100 
Number developer apps 28.916 (27.914) 48.376 (47.327) 1 313 
Total apps 256,735 175,996 29,721 542,446 
 Google Play 267,181 51,070 180,616 346,782 
 App Store 461,135 46,355 386,327 542,446 
 Blackberry World 41,891 6,611 29,721 52,376 
 Price (€) 1.94 2.11 0.1 10.99 
Note: The values outside the parentheses are computed at the observation level, whereas 
the values inside the parentheses are computed at the app level. However, for 
developer fame, developer type, and number developer apps the values inside the 
parentheses are computed at the developer level (the total number of developers is 
227), whereas for app size and first version they are computed at the app version level 
(the total number of different versions is 487). As for the developer rating dummies, 
the statistics are computed considering only the total observations because the rating 
may not only vary within the 34 weeks period but also among different apps of the 
same developer due to the fact that for each app we omit the relative rating to avoid a 
reverse causality problem. 
First of all, the price (in Euros) of the given app observed every Friday in one of the three 
store rankings is the dependent variable. To test the two-sided market effect, with no 
access to revenue information from third parties, e.g., advertisers, we analyse each app to 
check for the presence of ads inside the app. We also check whether the business model 
of each app is explicitly centred on gathering and selling (non-personally identifiable) 
data of a large user-base. Apps containing ads or supporting collection and sale of large 
amount of data operate as two-sided markets. Thus, we define a dummy variable  
(two-sided market effect) indicating whether the given app operates as a two-sided market 
or not. To test the effect of trialability (H2) we retrieve information on the existence of a 
proper free trial version for the app and introduce a dummy (free trial version) to 
measure the effect of trialability. As discussed earlier, we distinguish between proper free 
trial version, i.e., version offering very limited features or being time-locked, and free 
version, i.e., version that do not differ much from the paid version except for the presence 
of ads. We control for the effect of free versions including a specific variable (free 
version). We test H3 simply introducing a dummy variable (in-app purchase), which 
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indicates whether in-app purchase is implemented for the given paid app, or not. 
Collecting data about the specific version of each app also enables us to test whether 
price skimming or penetration price strategies are adopted. Therefore, we introduce a 
dummy (first version) indicating whether the first or a subsequent version is observed for 
each app. Finally, we consider the role of online mechanisms to build reputation on app 
price (H5). Usually, app stores allow users to provide apps’ rating on a 1-to-5 scale where 
1 corresponds to the worst valuation and 5 to excellent valuation5. However, no 
developer rating is available in the major distribution platforms, although in each store 
users can visualise the developer page with all the apps and the relative ratings. 
Therefore, to study the effect of these mechanisms, we construct a measure of 
developer’s current rating by computing the average ratings of all the apps marketed in 
the given store by the given content provider until the given week. In order to avoid any 
reverse causality problem, which might create endogeneity in the regression model, for 
each app we exclude the rating of the app itself when computing the average rating6. 
Also, sometimes no rating can be computed for some developers because the number of 
users who have provided a rating is too low (the threshold is determined by the specific 
app store) or no other apps have been marketed7. To cope with this issue, we construct 
three dummies based on the average rating: low rated developers (low developer rating) 
category if the average developer rating is below 2.5, medium rated developers (medium 
developer rating) category if the average developer rating is between 2.5 and 3.5 and 
high rated developers (high developer rating) category if the average developer rating is 
above 3.5. By doing so, we can compare the effect of low, medium and high developer 
ratings with respect to the absence of developer rating. Regarding the effect of reputation, 
we also include a dummy (developer fame), which indicates whether the developer/brand 
of the given app is one of those giant developers/brand reported in Table 1, who have a 
fully established reputation worldwide. 
Furthermore, we include some control variables, such as the app store (App Store, 
Google Play, Blackberry World), the app category (we count 12 different categories in 
our sample8), the type of developer (developer type), i.e., whether the content provider is 
a firm or (group of) individual(s), the number of apps marketed by each developer 
(number developer apps) in the given week and store, and the app size in megabyte (app 
size). Finally, we include a temporal dummy (weekt) for every Friday to control for any 
other potential cause of price change in specific weeks9. 
In addition to some dummies chosen as baseline variables due to perfect 
collinearity10, our preliminary analysis suggests that the variable medium developer 
Rating shows a serious degree of negative correlation with the variable high developer 
Rating (the Pearson correlation index is about –0.76). We remove medium developer 
Rating, as we are more interested in the effect of high developer rating on prices. After 
removing such variables we observe no further serious degree of collinearity. 
3.3 Empirical results 
In our regression model, we use a log-linear functional form, where the log-price is 
regressed against explanatory and control variables. Such functional form has been 
shown to be effective for hedonic price estimation (Gandal, 1994; Brynjolfsson and 
Kemerer, 1996; Gallaugher and Wang, 2002; Roma et al., 2013) and in other related 
pricing studies (e.g., Roma et al., 2014, 2015). When the number of statistical units is 
quite large compared to the observation period (number of weeks), three basic regression 
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models, namely pooled OLS, fixed effects and random effects models, are usually 
suggested (Wooldridge, 2002). However, the fixed effects model is not appropriate in our 
setting because some variables of interest, e.g., the distribution platform, are time 
invariant. Therefore, we preliminarily compare pooled OLS and random effects models. 
The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test strongly indicates the presence of random 
effects, as highlighted below Table 3, where the results under the random effects model 
are illustrated. For sake of parsimony, we use a stepwise procedure to eliminate the least 
relevant variables. We gradually delete the least significant variable and stop when the 
estimated coefficients are significant at least at the 10% level. The results of the restricted 
model are also presented in Table 3. We also report the F-test, which suggests that the 
full model does not provide any significant better fit than the restricted one. Due to very 
high similarities between full and restricted models, we only comment the restricted 
model. Before discussing the results of our formulated hypotheses, it is worthwhile to 
mention that, among the control variables, numerous, but not all, app categories, e.g., 
utility, music, money and finance, social networks, news and info, show significantly 
higher prices compared to the category games. Other categories, such as customisation 
and themes and photo and video, are shown to be not significant. This expected result 
could be attributed to the fact that different categories have different nature in terms of 
customer targets and/or needs. The type of developer and app size are also significant in 
explaining price formation. Specifically, firms enjoy higher prices than individual 
developers. This is intuitive because software houses are likely to have better 
development and marketing capabilities and a higher knowledge of the market, which 
possibly result in higher quality apps and a better exploitation of the market potential. It 
is also quite straightforward that, given that we control for the effect of different app 
categories, the conditional effect of the app size on price is positive as a higher size 
roughly reflects a higher complexity to respond to more sophisticated consumer targets 
and/or needs. Finally, only two temporal dummies have positive impact on price. Thus, 
no particular unobserved factors that we tried to capture introducing temporal dummies 
seem to be influential. 
Moving to major results, our first hypothesis is supported by empirical evidence. Top 
paid apps containing ads or supporting collection and sale of large amount of data show 
significantly lower prices. This suggests that apps have properties of two-sided markets. 
Specifically, the lower prices charged for apps showing such properties are the evidence 
of the subsidy provided by developers to end users as a consequence of the strong 
positive cross-side externalities exerted by them on valuable third parties, e.g., 
advertisers. In fact, as expected, third parties value end users, when attracted in mass, 
much more than end users value third parties. Managers and app developers may take 
advantage of our findings. In fact, lowering the price to the mass of end users to attract 
those third parties from which to profit abundantly. When, for instance, the presence of 
ads significantly increase to become a hassle, end users might even suffer from negative 
externalities. In this case, the subsidy might be so large to lead to the ‘free plus ads’ 
business model widely adopted in the app market. 
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Table 3 Random effects regression results under full and restricted models 
 
 
(1
) f
ul
l m
od
el
 
 
(2
) r
es
tr
ic
te
d 
m
od
el
 
 
Va
ri
ab
le
 
C
oe
ff.
 
Ro
bu
st
 s
t. 
er
ro
rs
 
Im
pa
ct
 %
 
 
C
oe
ff.
 
Ro
bu
st
 s
t. 
er
ro
rs
 
Im
pa
ct
 %
 
 
C
on
st
an
t–
 
0.
60
18
**
* 
(0
.0
95
8)
 
82
.5
4%
 
 
0.
68
41
**
* 
(0
.0
44
3)
 
98
.2
%
 
H
1 
Tw
o-
si
de
d 
m
ar
ke
t e
ffe
ct
 
–0
.1
69
6*
**
 
(0
.0
48
9)
 
–1
5.
6%
 
 
–0
.1
93
4*
**
 
(0
.0
42
2)
 
–1
7.
58
%
 
H
2 
Fr
ee
 tr
ia
l v
er
si
on
 
–0
.0
34
6 
(0
.0
62
6)
 
 
 
 
 
 
H
3 
In
-a
pp
 p
ur
ch
as
e 
0.
00
16
 
(0
.0
57
3)
 
 
 
 
 
 
H
4 
Fi
rs
t v
er
si
on
 
0.
02
94
 
(0
.0
22
2)
 
 
 
0.
04
77
* 
(0
.0
22
3)
 
4.
89
%
 
Lo
w
 d
ev
el
op
er
 ra
tin
g 
0.
06
 
(0
.0
69
5)
 
 
 
 
 
 
H
ig
h 
de
ve
lo
pe
r r
at
in
g 
0.
01
27
 
(0
.0
28
2)
 
 
 
 
 
 
H
5 
D
ev
el
op
er
 fa
m
e 
0.
08
72
 
(0
.0
85
6)
 
 
 
 
 
 
A
pp
 st
or
e 
–0
.3
99
5*
**
 
(0
.0
60
9)
 
–3
2.
93
%
 
 
–0
.3
71
7*
**
 
(0
.0
53
) 
–3
1.
04
%
 
G
oo
gl
e 
pl
ay
 
0.
15
54
* 
(0
.0
68
4)
 
16
.8
1%
 
 
0.
15
13
* 
(0
.0
60
5)
 
16
.3
3%
 
So
ci
al
 n
et
w
or
k 
0.
30
68
**
* 
(0
.0
80
3)
 
35
.9
1%
 
 
0.
24
54
**
* 
(0
.0
66
2)
 
27
.8
1%
 
Fu
n 
an
d 
en
te
rta
in
m
en
t 
0.
17
67
* 
(0
.0
72
6)
 
19
.3
3%
 
 
 
 
 
M
us
ic
 
0.
39
93
**
* 
(0
.0
98
7)
 
49
.0
8%
 
 
0.
32
15
**
* 
(0
.0
92
8)
 
37
.9
2%
 
U
til
ity
 
0.
29
45
**
* 
(0
.0
69
3)
 
34
.2
5%
 
 
0.
20
7*
**
 
(0
.0
55
5)
 
23
%
 
Ph
ot
o 
an
d 
vi
de
o 
0.
11
1†
 
(0
.0
63
2)
 
11
.7
4%
 
 
 
 
 
Th
em
es
 a
nd
 c
us
to
m
iz
at
io
n 
0.
09
07
 
(0
.0
79
4)
 
 
 
 
 
 
H
ea
lth
ca
re
 a
nd
 fi
tn
es
s 
0.
09
28
 
(0
.1
02
1)
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tr
an
sp
or
ta
tio
n 
0.
30
13
 
(0
.2
33
1)
 
 
 
 
 
 
M
on
ey
 a
nd
 fi
na
nc
e 
0.
27
81
* 
(0
.1
18
3)
 
32
.0
6%
 
 
0.
17
6†
 
(0
.0
94
8)
 
19
.2
4%
 
N
ew
s a
nd
 in
fo
 
0.
21
43
**
* 
(0
.0
57
8)
 
23
.9
%
 
 
0.
12
45
**
 
(0
.0
40
5)
 
13
.2
6%
 
Ed
uc
at
io
n 
0.
20
34
 
(0
.2
10
2)
 
 
 
 
 
 
D
ev
el
op
er
 ty
pe
 
0.
12
07
**
 
(0
.0
43
8)
 
12
.8
3%
 
 
0.
10
85
**
 
(0
.0
38
4)
 
11
.4
6%
 
Fr
ee
 v
er
si
on
 
–0
.0
27
3 
(0
.0
37
2)
 
 
 
 
 
 
A
pp
 si
ze
 (l
og
) 
0.
09
59
**
* 
(0
.0
24
1)
 
10
.0
6%
 
 
0.
08
41
**
* 
(0
.0
19
8)
 
8.
77
%
 
N
um
be
r d
ev
el
op
er
 a
pp
s (
lo
g)
 
0.
01
16
 
(0
.0
14
8)
 
 
 
 
 
 
W
ee
k 
18
 
–0
.0
63
9 
(0
.0
59
8)
 
 
 
–0
.0
15
6*
 
(0
.0
07
5)
 
–1
.5
5%
 
C
on
tro
ls
 
W
ee
k 
26
 
–0
.1
02
8 
(0
.0
66
8)
 
 
 
–0
.0
58
1*
 
(0
.0
27
9)
 
–5
.6
4%
 
N
ot
es
: †
 p
 <
 0
.1
0,
 *
 p
 <
 0
.0
5,
 *
* 
p 
< 
0.
01
, *
**
 p
 <
 0
.0
01
. S
ta
nd
ar
d 
er
ro
rs
 a
re
 ro
bu
st
 to
 h
et
er
os
ke
da
st
ic
ity
 a
nd
 se
ria
l c
or
re
la
tio
n.
 B
re
us
ch
 a
nd
 P
ag
an
 L
ag
ra
ng
ia
n 
m
ul
tip
lie
r 
te
st
 fo
r r
an
do
m
 e
ff
ec
ts
: χ
2 (
1)
 =
 6
01
5.
12
, p
 =
 0
.0
00
 fo
r t
he
 fu
ll 
m
od
el
; χ
2  (
1)
 =
 6
95
8.
41
, p
 =
 0
.0
00
 fo
r t
he
 re
st
ric
te
d 
m
od
el
. S
ta
tis
tic
s o
f F
-te
st
 (r
es
tri
ct
ed
 v
s. 
fu
ll 
m
od
el
s)
: F
(4
4,
 9
62
) >
 1
.0
36
. 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   176 P. Roma and G. Dominici    
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
Table 3 Random effects regression results under full and restricted models (continued) 
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Our empirical analysis provides an interesting result regarding hypothesis H2. In our 
sample, the effect of the free trial version on app price is shown to be not significant. 
Essentially, there is no evidence that top paid apps for which free trial versions are 
available are sold at a higher price compared to top paid apps for which a free trial 
version is not released. This happens even after distinguishing between free trial version 
and free version. Recall that this distinction helps remove the possible risk of demand 
cannibalisation for paid apps and focus only on the role of proper free trial versions, i.e., 
those versions designed only with the scope to reduce asymmetry and help consumers 
discover the real value of a product to them. Therefore, the result suggests that, in case of 
top paid apps, consumers do not recognise any price premium to developers who 
introduce a free trial version. This is because consumers possibly perceive free trial 
versions as something useful to evaluate whether to make the purchase or not, rather than 
a vehicle to increase their willingness to pay. After all, they face low risks associated 
with the uncertainty about the product value due to the relatively low prices of top paid 
apps. In addition, perhaps, the fact that an app is in the top ten ranking is itself a strong 
signal of quality, which may cancel the positive effect of the free trial version on price. 
However, it is worthwhile to point out that, even with no impact on price, the presence of 
a free trial version might still have positive effects on the revenue developers can earn 
from the corresponding paid app due to the positive effect on sales. 
Similarly to the effect of trialability, the effect of in-app purchase on app price is 
shown to be not significant. Developers giving consumers the opportunity to make in-app 
purchases do not reduce the price of the base version, as theory would suggest. In fact,  
in-app purchase does not determine any price difference in our sample of successful paid 
apps. This is possibly explained by the strong consumer reluctance to buy further 
upgrades after having already paid for the base version, which, in turn, induces 
developers to raise the price level to prevent revenue losses. Numerous recent industry 
reports assert that in-app purchase has become amazingly popular among app users 
(Spriensma, 2012). While, this might appear in contrast with our result, there is actually 
no contrast as the acclaimed success of in-app purchase is related to free apps, certainly 
not to paid apps. As a matter of fact, analytics company Apsalar explains that in-app 
purchases are viewed by consumers as substitutes of paid apps, in the sense that in-app 
purchases are not attractive to consumers if they have already paid for an app (Apsalar, 
2012). Therefore, our result on the role of in-app purchase seems to be consistent with 
industry feedbacks. 
As for the effect of the initial version, hypothesis H4b is confirmed, although only 
when the reduced model is considered. Apps first released show higher prices than apps 
available in subsequent versions, ceteris paribus. This seems to suggest that app 
developers favour a price skimming strategy rather than a penetration strategy. Based on 
theory, this implies the existence of a market with high customer heterogeneity that 
developers can profitably segment extracting surplus from valuable users first. In case of 
top paid apps, the benefits derived taking advantage from such customer heterogeneity 
seem to prevail over those developers could obtain setting low introductory prices and 
exploiting network externalities among users. Interestingly, this result adds to the result 
on the effect of trialability, possibly subtracting support to the argument that network 
externalities have a role in app price formation as prominent as that in other software 
markets. As a matter of fact, under both cases, we do not observe evidence of particularly 
strong network externalities among users. 
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Finally, a further surprising result is related to the effect of online mechanisms to 
build reputation. Consistent with most of the literature, we would have expected a 
positive impact of such mechanisms. However, we find no empirical evidence of the role 
of online reputation mechanisms, in line with a minority of studies. In fact, in case of top 
paid apps, data seem to suggest that developers of apps with high ratings on average are 
not guaranteed to enjoy price premiums. Also, low ratings or absence of ratings do not 
affect price negatively. The negligible effect of online reputation mechanisms in the 
context of successful apps might be explained by the substitutable role of ratings and top 
rankings as mechanisms to signal quality in presence of product/seller uncertainty. The 
fact that an app ranks among top ten apps represents itself a sort of guarantee to 
consumers, which might make the role of ratings irrelevant. Interestingly, our results also 
show that no price premiums are reserved to developers with a fully established 
reputation worldwide. Therefore, our analysis suggests that reputation is not likely to play 
a crucial role in determining prices at least when top paid apps are considered. To 
ascertain whether reputation has a relevant role in price formation on a more general 
level, apps should be observed from the very early stages of market introduction until 
they steadily reach top ranks. The study of apps along their lifecycle can be a promising 
research direction. The summary of our findings and the relative explanations are 
provided in Table 4. 
Table 4 Summary of the findings 
Variables Status Motivation 
H1 Two-sided market 
effect 
Confirmed Developers of apps operating as two-sided 
markets are confirmed to strategically reduce the 
price to end users as they can count on the 
positive externalities they exert on third parties, 
e.g., advertisers. 
H2 Trialability effect Not confirmed The fact that the effect of trialability is not 
significant in the context of successful apps is 
possibly explained by the low risks consumers 
perceive relatively to the uncertainty on product 
value as top paid apps have low prices and are 
already in a top ranking. 
H3 In-app purchase 
effect 
Not confirmed The non-significance of the in-app purchase effect 
for paid apps can be explained by due to 
consumers’ reluctance to additional payments. 
H4 Introductory pricing 
policy effect 
Confirmed The analysis provides slightly evidence that 
developers adopt price skimming strategy 
possibly because the customer heterogeneity in 
terms of willingness to pay is a more relevant 
issue as compared with the effect of network 
externalities in the context of paid apps. 
H5 Reputation effect Not confirmed The non-significance of the reputation variables is 
likely to be due to the fact that the persistent 
presence in the top paid ranking is already a 
mechanism to signal long-term quality. 
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4 Conclusions 
4.1 Managerial implications 
Since the App Store introduction, mobile apps commerce has grown exponentially, and 
numerous researches predict an even rosier future in the next years. This rapid growth of 
the app market offers numerous business opportunities to a multitude of developers. It 
also offers a great opportunity for researchers to examine various theoretical and/or 
methodological issues. However, despite the great popularity the mobile app market has 
reached, the academic study of this market has just started. In this paper, we construct a 
hedonic price model and test a number of hypotheses to examine the role of relevant 
factors in price formation in the app market. Specifically, we investigate price formation 
based on a sample of top paid apps for smartphones from the Italian version of the major 
app stores, namely App Store, Google Play and Blackberry World.  
Based on our results we can make several remarkable points. The negative 
relationship between the two-sided market dummy and the app price provides the first 
empirical evidence in the software market of how the adoption of a two-sided market 
business model can modify the price charged to consumers. This is because developers of 
apps operating as two-sided markets strategically reduce the price to end users as they 
can count on the positive externalities they exert on the opposite side, e.g., advertisers. In 
this case, developers make profits from these more valuable third parties. 
Second, most of previous empirical studies show that there exist positive effects of 
trialability and online mechanisms to build reputation on product price. In contrast, our 
results suggest that such positive influences might not be in place in the context of 
successful apps. As for the role of trialability, this is possibly explained by the low risks 
consumers perceive relatively to the uncertainty on product value as top paid apps have 
low prices. Therefore, while trialability might still important to induce consumers’ 
purchases, developers who release free trial versions should not expect to extract a higher 
surplus from top paid app users. As for the role of online mechanisms to build reputation, 
the argument that sellers can enjoy price premiums as a return of high ratings is not 
supported at least for top paid apps. This is possibly because in consumers’ mind the 
presence of an app among top apps is already a guarantee of quality. Therefore, while it 
would be interesting to study the effect of reputation mechanisms along the entire app 
lifecycle, our result poses a question on the actual effectiveness of app ratings to generate 
reputation benefits in a context where consumers are induced to visualise only apps 
appearing in top rankings. Our finding implies that, at least for top paid apps, developers 
should not care much about the rating mechanisms provided by the app stores. Another 
implication is related to app store owners who might reconsider and revamp the logic 
behind providing these ratings in order to make them more impactful at least with regard 
to top paid apps. 
Third, we find no evidence that apps allowing in-app purchase are associated with 
lower prices. This result actually seems to support previous arguments on the  
non-optimality of versioning information goods found under numerous settings. It is also 
consistent with some industry reports pointing out that consumers consider in-app 
purchases as economic substitutes of paid apps. By maintaining prices as high as those of 
developers who do not offer the in-app purchase option, developers offering this 
opportunity seem to protect themselves from revenue losses due to consumers’ reluctance 
to additional payments. Thus, our result would imply reconsidering the suitability of the 
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in-app purchase model for paid apps. In fact, our suggestion to developers is in fact that 
they should avoid opting for in-app purchase if they have chosen a paid app strategy. 
Finally, our finding that initial versions are associated with higher prices seems to 
demonstrate a slight prevalence of price skimming strategy over price penetration. This 
might implicitly indicate the existence of a high consumers’ heterogeneity in terms of 
willingness to pay, which more than outweighs the effect of intra-network externalities. 
Therefore, although evidence is provided using an indirect measure of the intra-network 
externalities effect (i.e., our variable first version), an interesting implication is that 
network externalities in the app market might not have a role as prominent as they do in 
other information goods markets and thus in general developer should tend to adopt a 
price skimming strategy. In fact, marketing theory suggests that, everything else equal, 
firms should opt for price skimming strategy over price penetration strategy when 
network externalities are not very relevant as compared to consumers’ heterogeneity in 
terms of willingness to pay (Dean, 1969; Tellis, 1986; Noble and Gruca, 1999). 
4.2 Research limitations and future research 
To the best of our knowledge this is one of the very first studies focusing on the app 
market, and the first study examining the role of relevant factors in price formation in the 
app market. Therefore, there are some natural limitations, which could be overcome in 
future works. First, although we extended the period of observation compared to previous 
works on the app market, the present study is constrained by the time period. Perhaps, 
due to the turbulences typical of new and fast growing markets, results may change over 
time if competition and demand conditions vary. However, most of the results we obtain 
seem to be either consistent with preceding literature, e.g., the two-sided effect, or 
supported by reports from industry experts, e.g., the role of distribution platform or  
in-app purchase. Second, data are restricted to top ten paid apps. While this helps reduce 
the collection effort required by the extensive amount of data, an analysis using a larger 
number of ranked apps at the expense of a shorter observation period would certainly 
complement the present study. As noted earlier, a possible disadvantage of this kind of 
analysis might be the absence of a significant increase in the number of apps due to the 
low variability that can be found, especially in the first ranks, in a short time period. Also, 
many variables of interest, e.g., the price, might not change if the time period is short, 
resulting in duplications of the same information.  
Echoing Garg and Telang (2013), we expect that many researchers will devote 
themselves to the study of this market. There is a wide spectrum of possible research 
directions besides the above extensions. For instance, a promising direction may be the 
study of distribution platform competition. The app distribution model is more than a 
simple two-sided market due to the presence of numerous business interactions. As a 
result, numerous relevant issues, such as new product or alliance decisions in competitive 
environments (Lo Nigro et al., 2013), should be investigated taking into account the 
network structure and the existing interactions. 
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Notes 
1 Data sources: http://www.pocketgamer.biz/metrics/app-store/?mpage=appcount; 
http://www.appbrain.com/stats/number-of-android-apps; 
http://techcrunch.com/2014/06/02/itunes-app-store-now-has-1-2-million-apps-has-seen-75-
billion-downloads-to-date/; http://www.techrepublic.com/article/google-play-v-apple-app-
store-the-battle-for-the-mobile-app-market/; 
http://www.statista.com/statistics/281106/number-of-android-app-downloads-from-google-
play/. 
2 Note that which group should be subsidised also depends on segment’s direct price elasticity 
and the size of the two groups (Rochet and Tirole, 2003; Parker and van Alstyne, 2005; 
Eisenmann et al., 2006). 
3 The full list of developers in our sample belonging to the category of giant developers with 
established worldwide notoriety is provided in Table 1.  
4 The number of apps is 299. However, only 16 apps are available in the top ten rankings of two 
or three stores. Therefore, the number of statistical units is 315. 
5 Note that Blackberry World actually adopts a 0-to-5 scale. However, this is not a relevant 
issue in our sample as no rating equal to zero is observed. 
6 Note, in fact, that the rating of an app might be affected by the price of the same app as a 
higher price might create higher expectations of consumers, who will be more likely to 
complain about product flaws and provide lower ratings to the given app. Therefore, by 
excluding the rating of the given app from developer rating computation, we reduce the risk of 
incurring in reverse causality problem, while still having a measure of reputation at the 
developer level. 
7 In our sample there were a few cases of developers marketing only one app. According to our 
procedure, they were considered as not having a rating. This should not create much 
distortion, as it is reasonable that most of developers marketing only one app are less able to 
consolidate a reputation in a store via online mechanisms than developers marketing more 
apps. 
8 Note that the process of homogenising app classification into thematic categories is quite 
simple in our dataset because the three stores have implemented very similar category 
systems. 
9 We also introduced the total number of apps available in each distribution platform at a given 
week. We can reasonably assume that competition will be higher (and, thus, price will be 
lower) in a store where a higher number of apps are available. This is further supported by the 
fact that the average number of apps per developer in our sample is 1.32. However, we 
removed this variable due to very high positive (negative) correlation, i.e., 0.82 (–0.86), with 
the dummy App Store (Blackberry World). In fact, a perfect ranking of the three stores (in 
sequence, App Store, Google Play and Blackberry World) was observed in all the weeks. 
10 The dummies chosen as baseline variables are Blackberry World, No Rating Developer and 
Games for distribution platform, rating and category variable types, respectively. In addition, 
the first Friday is chosen as baseline with regard to the temporal dummies. 
